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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,

]

v.

]

ERIC LEON BUTT, JR.,

)
;

Appellant.

Appeal No. 20090655

]

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
BUTT DISTRIBUTED HARMFUL MATERIAL.
This Court has held, iC[g]enerally, the function of a reviewing court is limited to
insuring that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the charge to
enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the
crime." State v. Pearson. 1999 UT App. 220, 1J13, 985 P.2d 919 (internal quotations
omitted), citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah \99l)(quoting State v. Warden,
813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991)). The Utah Supreme Court has held as follows
concerning the elements of the offense and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard:
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless
each element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The
Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status,
linking it to both the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,

278, 113 S.Ct 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); Winship, 397 U.S. at 362,
364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. The degree of certainty of guilt that we insist be held by
those entrusted with judging the fate of persons charged with crimes before
we will permit the State to wield its power to punish is not only a measure
of evidence, but also in a more fundamental sense a gauge of our nation's
conscience. The measure of certainty the law demands before finding guilt
reflects the balance we are willing to strike between ensuring that all of the
guilty are brought to justice and preventing the conviction and punishment
of the innocent.
State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, Tfl 1, 116 P.3d 305.
"Distribute'' is defined by UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(3) as, "to transfer
possession of materials whether with or without consideration." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-4101 governs the charge of Attempting to Distribute Harmful Materials and states as
follows:
For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime
if he: (a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward
commission of the crime; and (b) (i) intends to commit the crime; or (ii)
when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an
awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result. (2) For
purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly
corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b).
Ibid. In State v. Hopkins, the Utah Court of Appeals discussed what must be proven to
convict someone of attempting to deal harmful material to a minor, stating as follows:
To convict Hopkins of attempted dealing in material harmful to a minor,
the State had to prove that knowing the person was a minor or "having
negligently failed to determine the proper age of a minor," he intentionally
took a substantial step to "distribute[] ... to a minor any material harmful
to minors:' [UTAH CODE ANN. §§] 76-10-1206(l)(a) [and] 76-4-101.
Ibid, 2009 UT App 165, %L9 2009 WL 1709246 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme
Court has stated as follows:
This Court has in numerous cases stated that in presenting defenses in
2

criminal cases a defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion. It is
sufficient for acquittal that the evidence or lack thereof creates a reasonable
doubt as to any element of the crime.
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980), citing State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah
1977) (further citations omitted).
"It is an offense to take a letter or other mail matter before delivery to the
addressee^] with the intent to obstruct correspondence or to pry into the business of
another." 72 C.J.S. Postal Service § 80. Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1702, it states as follows:
Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or
any authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier,
or which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the
custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the
person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence,
or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes,
embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
It is axiomatic that citizens have the right to rely upon the laws of the land as they are
written and as reasonably interpreted.
"The common law mailbox rule has been in existence for well over a
century...and was given full judicial imprimatur by the U.S. Supreme Court over 120
years ago. . ." Rios v. Mansfield, 21 Vet.App. 481, 482 (Vet.App. 2007)(citations
omitted). "The rule is well settled that if a letter properly directed is proved to have been
either put into the post-office or delivered to the postman, it is presumed, from the known
course of business in the post-office department, that it reached its destination at the

An "addressee'' is defined as "one to whom something is addressed."
See, www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/addressee. The term "address" in the verb tense means to "communicate directly," "to
speak or write directly to" and "to identify...by an address or a name for information transfer." See, www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/addressed.
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regular time, and was received by the person to whom it was addressed"" Rosenthal v.
Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193, 4 S.Ct. 382 (U.S. 1884)(citations omitted)(emphasis added).
"[T]he presumption so arising is not a conclusive presumption of law, but a mere
inference of fact, founded on the probability that the officers of the government will do
their duty and the usual course of business. . ." Id., citing Huntley v. Whittier, 105 Mass.
392. "[I]t is perfectly clear that [the presumption] applie[s] without regard to the contents
of the letter." Id. at 194. "[T]he fact that receipt of the letter subjects the person sending
it to a penalty does not alter the rule." Hagner v. U.S., 285 U.S. 427, 431, 52 S.Ct. 417,
419 (U.S. 1932), citing Rosenthal 111 U.S. at 194.
In Sorrentino v. I.R.S. it states that, "[w]hen mail matter is properly addressed and
deposited in the United States mails, with postage duly prepaid thereon, there is a
rebuttable presumption of fact that it was received by the addressee in the ordinary course
of mail." Ibid, 383 F.3d 1187, 1190 (C.A. 10 (Colo.) 2004)(emphasis added), citing
Crude Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1947). However, the common
law presumption under this "mailbox rule" discussed supra only attaches when it is
demonstrated that it was "properly directed" or "properly addressed." Collins v. Peake,
2008 WL 4963351, *2 (Vet.App. 2008), citing Rios v. Nicholson, 490 F.3d 928, 933
(Fed.Cir. 2007). It has been determined that the term "properly directed" as used in
Rosenthal, supra, is not met when something as simple as an incorrect zip code is
utilized. See, Busquets-Ivars v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 1008, 1010 (C.A.9 2003). It can be
presumed that the term "properly addressed" in Sorrentino would result in the same for

4

lack of any portion of a correct address of the addressee, let alone if the item was directed
at someone else entirely, as is the case in the instant matter.
In its Brief of Appellee, the State attempts to argue that the evidence provided to
the jury proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Butt distributed harmful material to his
daughter. Brief of Appellee at p. 15. The State erroneously argues that the letter, which
was both "properly directed" and "properly addressed" to his wife, was actually to both
her and their daughter since the child's initials appear on the cover of the envelope in a
decor, but are clearly outside the addressee portion.
The United States Postal Service regulations do not support the State's
interpretation of the addressing of the mail at issue herein. The following example taken
from

their

website,

at

www.usps.com/send/preparemailandpackages/

labelsandaddressing/usingthecorrectaddress.htm shows how to "properly address" or
"properly direct" an item of mail:
• Addressing ymir Mail
- Postage
Ussj 4 sUars;. Dtsiaqe -v*te> as PC F ^ a g *
K> *8lx »s6 t w f a c t a;r:-ju> tt. Us« our £•:**>»
CasaHaic* Si cataji»tt> postage- nates'.

• tteiwery Address
PTWU cjsarty « K aafwery adores*
isaraSe; '<ofcaekingest ««3e o« Use
P^oUHjjj. Do r*si i « « c«oir:»i of

Return Address
Prist «• tyjve your ar»«<ss ifupp*r Sett oorrsar or. tha i t w

Ctty. S t a t e . sma ZiP C o d e
~b fnvi tha carra-t s p r i n g or a 2;p Cede.
use our onsoe Zip Coaafocau* - .

• Addressing your Package
Fteiurn A d d r e s s
in.mn
Hf?!t or typ* ya'jr aocr~*^> )»-. P*'
uppi.r tefi «Ofi«f no t?« ifon< of

Delwsry Address
Prsr" c<e&U tKt- d 4 ' l w „
eKJOfless p*ttB«t h'; she k*\>>'
sK» st HM package C-s reus? cof'ioai or pwsds

Postage
Us* a stamp, postosje m*J«* or
PC P o s i a s s io aiSx t t e coftsct

City. S t a t * , a n a Ztf» C o d s
To fend m* cancel ssssjiog w a Zip
Code use our CTHXVS Zip U<x»
<as*lorV
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Clearly, the State's interpretation that the initials of the Children appearing in a decor on
the outside of the envelope would be outside the perimeters of what would be considered
"properly addressed" or "properly directed" to them.
Butt mailed a letter addressed to his wife by placing it in the mail box provided for
inmates at the San Juan County Jail.

When Butt's letters were discovered by jail

officials, they were confiscated. Butt testified he did send the Letters and addressed them
to his wife. The originals appear in the record on this matter. Butt testified he knew his
wife would see the pictures and, since she reads everything to the kids, he figured she
would get a laugh out of it, stating, "[i]t's a pretty pathetic drawing." Butt indicated he
intended for his children to see the pictures. Tr. at p. 113. However, Butt did not commit
any substantial step to "distribute" the material to a minor, as that term's ordinary and
accepted meaning implies.
Butt was allowed to reasonably rely on 18 U.S.C.A. §1702 in addressing the
envelope to his wife, with expectations that she would be the one to open it. He properly
addressed it to her, with the addressee portion of the envelope containing her name and
address. His intentions that she be the one to open the letter and review the contents
inside is supported by the language contained in his letter alerting her to the explanation
behind the rudimentary drawing at issue herein.
He did not transfer the drawing directly to his daughter. UTAH CODE ANN.§76-101201. He transferred the letters to his wife, and even alerted her to the contents for
screening before giving the pictures at issue to his daughter. Contrary to the State's
argument, the envelope contained in the record on appeal evidences it was addressed to
6

his wife, not his children. Under Sorrentino this would ensure that such mail would be
delivered directly to her and not the children.
Butt specifically mentioned the drawing to his wife in the Letters asking her
whether it was appropriate to provide it to the daughter. He knew that she would not
show the drawing to his daughter if she felt it was inappropriate, she was in the best
position to make that call. To convict him of distributing harmful material to a minor, the
State must prove the he intentionally took a substantial step towards distributing the
material to his daughter. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1206(1). The State has not proven
this beyond a reasonable doubt as Butt took no step toward distributing the Letters. He
simply granted his daughter's request and left it up to the mother as to whether his
daughter would even be allowed to see the drawings. See, State's Exhibit #2, the First
Letter.

He did nothing to intentionally transfer the Letters to his daughter.

To

intentionally transfer the letters to his daughter, Butt would have needed to address the
letters directly to her, thereby circumventing her mother's review of such letters. This did
not occur. He sent the letters to his wife and allowed her to determine whether the
children could see the drawings.
Butt relinquished his possession of the Letters to another adult to whom the
Letters were addressed. This is not a crime. He did not mail the Letters directly to his
daughter, nor did he ensure she would have possession of the contents. Butt anticipated
that his wife would preview the contents first and, if she did not feel the contents were
appropriate, would not show his daughter the drawings. The Letters were directed and
transferred to his adult wife. Accordingly, Butt's distribution of the material to another

7

adult does not meet the elements for dealing harmful material to a minor as set forth in
UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-10-1206. The material was distributed to another adult, causing no

violation of the law.

Thus, because it has not been shown that Butt intentionally

distributed the drawings to his daughter, instead he intentionally distributed to his wife,
which is not a crime the evidence is insufficient to meet the elements on dealing harmful
material to a minor beyond a reasonable doubt.
IL

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S
CONCLUSION THAT BUTT'S LETTERS WERE HARMFUL TO A
MINOR.

In its Brief of Appellee the State argues that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to establish that Butt's letters were harmful to his daughter beyond a reasonable
doubt. Brief of Appellee at p. 18. The State is mistaken in this argument.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-10-1206(1) states as follows:

A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing
or believing that a person is a minor, or having negligently failed to
determine the proper age of a minor, the person intentionally: (a) distributes
or offers to distribute, or exhibits or offers to exhibit, to a minor or a person
the actor believes to be a minor, any material harmful to minors;...[.]
In the instant case, Butt argues the evidence was insufficient on the elements of
the harmful material statute to convict him of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. See,
Torres at 695. The State failed to produce sufficient evidence on the elements that Butt
distributed harmful material to a minor beyond a reasonable doubt. See, Reyes at ^fl 1. To
allow the Verdict in this matter to stand allows for a lesser degree of certainty of guilt
than the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt suggests, infringing upon Butt's Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights. Id. The State has inappropriately wielded its power in this
8

matter. The measure of certainty in this case reflects an imbalance of the prevention of
conviction and punishment of the innocent. See, id. Accordingly, as the evidence was
insufficient to support the Verdict on several elements beyond a reasonable doubt, this
Court must vacate the Verdict.
The State has presented no evidence that meet the elements set forth in UTAH
CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(5). While the Letters may be construed as inappropriate by
some standards, there was no evidence that they met the definition of "harmful material,"
as set forth in the Code. It must also be shown that what may be considered harmful to
an adult or even a teenager may not be harmful to a very young child. The rudimentary
drawings by Butt may have incited inappropriate thoughts in a teenager or even an adult
because of their greater knowledge base. However, to a young and naive child who lacks
such knowledge, the rudimentary drawings would have meant nothing more than
hieroglyphs on a cave wall and would not have been harmful. Thus, Butt was unlawfully
convicted on a standard below that of "beyond a reasonable doubt" and his conviction
should thus be overturned.
A. There was insufficient evidence to show that Butt's pictures
appealed to the prurient interest in sex of minors.
In it's Brief of Appellee the State claims that there was sufficient evidence to
show that Butt violated UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1201 (5)(a)(i), which requires that the
material, 'taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors" to show that
it is harmful. Brief of Appellee at p. 25. The State is incorrect in this argument.

9

The Utah Supreme Court indicated that "the definition of 'prurient interest' raises
conceptual and definitional difficulties. . .[although contemporary community standards
provide the legal point of reference for determining prurient interest, mere nudity or
simple reference to or discussion of sex does not, as a matter of law, appeal to the
prurient interest." City of St. George v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929, 934 (Utah 1993). "A
prurient interest in sex under the law is not the same as a candid, wholesome, or healthy
interest in sex." Id., citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498, 105
S.Ct. 2794, 2798-99, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985); State v. Bartanen, 121 Ariz. 454, 591 P.2d
546 cert, denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S.Ct. 174, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979).

"[W]hen

determining whether a work appeals to the prurient interest, it must be judged as a whole,
and not on the basis of its isolated parts." Id., citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957).
In the instant matter, the rudimentary drawings at issue would not have appealed
to the prurient interest of Butt's five (5) year old daughter. The rudimentary nature of the
pictures at issue would be less likely to appeal to the prurient interest of a five year old
child than taking that child to a museum with other types of artwork and statues depicting
nudity. Appealing to the prurient interest would seem to require, at a minimum, the
possibility of inciting a child exposed to such to ask questions about sex.

The

rudimentary pictures at issue herein do not depict a sexual act of any kind, and are
nothing more than stick figures depicted by an amateur artist.
Furthermore, in the Brief of Appellee the State relies upon the matter of Ginsberg
v. New York 390 U.S. 629, 88 S. Ct.1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 to show that what may be
10

considered okay for adults may still be considered obscene for minors. Brief of Appellee
at p. 21. However, the State is incorrect in its reliance upon this matter. Not only does
Ginsberg rely upon a New York State statute that has since been changed and
renumbered, it was also handed down five (5) years prior to the case of Miller v.
California 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419. While the State concedes that
Ginsberg preceded Miller, it argues that the Supreme Court has never changed what it
stated in Ginsberg with regards to the states being allowed to withhold material from
minors even if such material would not be considered obscene to adults.

Brief of

Appellee at p. 21. Miller remains the precedent in this matter as the more recent decision
of the two (2) cases. Thus, the State is incorrect in its reliance upon Ginsberg.
Therefore, since a prurient interest in the rudimentary drawings depicted by an
amateur artist would not be incited in a five year old due to naivety and lack of
knowledge about such things, it is clear that the drawings created by Butt did not appeal
to her prurient interest and thus, were not harmful.
B. THE STATE DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
ALLOW THE JURY TO CONCLUDE THAT BUTT'S DRAWINGS
VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE COMMUNITY STANDARD.
In its Brief of Appellee the State continues to argue that the drawings were
sufficient for the jury to determine that they violated the contemporary community
standards. Brief of Appellee at p. 28. The State continues to be incorrect in making this
argument.
"Contemporary community standards" is defined as "those current standards in the
vicinage where an offense alleged under this part has occurred, is occurring, or will
11

occur." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(2). The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[t]he
wording the statute clearly establishes a local standard as opposed to a statewide
standard" according the statute's plain language. State v. International Amusements, 565
P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977). International Amusements continued as follows:
A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the
average person in the community or vicinage from which he comes for
making the required determination, just as he is entitled to draw on his
knowledge of the propensities of a "reasonable" person in other areas of the
law.
Id. at 1114, quoting Hambling v. U. S„ 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590
(1974).
The United States Supreme Court has determined the following concerning
community standards:
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations
on the powers of the States do not vary from community to community, but
this does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform
national standards of precisely what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is
'patently offensive.' These are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation
is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that
such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation,
even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists. When triers of fact are
asked to decide whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would consider certain materials 'prurient,' it would
be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some abstract
formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate
factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers of fact
to draw on the standards of their community, guided always by limiting
instructions on the law. To require a State to structure obscenity
proceedings around evidence of a national 'community standard' would be
an exercise in futility.
Miller at 30.
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In the instant case, the State failed to present any evidence to the prevailing
standard in the adult community that would deem the Letters "patently offensive" except
for jail officials own personal concern about them. The factors for determining whether
material or performance is pornographic are identical to determining whether material is
harmful to a minor. See, UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1203(1) and UTAH CODE ANN. §7610-1201(5). Obscenity will not be prosecuted unless it is patently offensive "hard core"
sexual conduct. Miller at 27. The nature of the drawings in the Letters at issue herein
would not be considered patently offensive to the adult community. The Letters do not
depict hard core pornography, or even a sexual act. The drawings are merely crude stick
figures attempting to depict nudity, but do not depict any sexual acts, masturbation, or
lewdness. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(14). They are no different than what a child
may see in a museum with nude statues or hieroglyphs at Native American ruins. As
those things are not considered to be patently offensive to the community standard, the
rudimentary stick drawings cannot rise to such level.
The Letters depict simple stick figures that were drawn based upon a documentary
watched by a father and daughter and based upon a game played by a father and
daughter.

Parents in Utah are allowed to accompany minors into R-rated movies

depicting images of actual sex and nudity without fear of prosecution. It is axiomatic that
the Letters are completely harmless in comparison and depict only those things a child
would see in a documentary about cave dwellings, museum, or ancient ruins.
The contemporary community standards to be applied in this matter was that of
the vicinage wherein the offenses alleged occurred. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(2).
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The jurors in this matter were entitled to draw on his or her own knowledge of the views
of the average person in their community for making this determination, just as he or she
would be entitled to draw on his or her knowledge of the propensities of a reasonable
person in other areas of the law. International Amusements at 1114. Miller determined a
jury should rely on local standards of what the community would consider obscene. Id. at
26. The community standards throughout the State of Utah have been recognized by the
Legislature to be diverse; hence, the triers of fact were asked to decide whether the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would consider the Letters
patently offensive. See, Miller at 30. The average person would most likely not find the
drawings patently offensive but merely rudimentary drawings by an amateur artist.
The drawings were created in this matter are not patently offensive to the
community standards was insufficient evidence presented to establish this and thus,
Butt's conviction should be overturned.
III.

FAILURE TO READ BUTT HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS PRIOR TO
QUESTIONS CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED HARMLESS UNDER
THE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD.

Finally, in the Brief of Appellee the State argues that the failure to give Miranda
warnings was harmless to Butt. Brief of Appellee at p.37. For the State to prevail on this
argument, this Court must determine that the failure to provide such warnings was not
just harmless, but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
"It is well established that the admission of statements obtained in violation of
Miranda can be harmless error." State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah
1986)(quotations and citation omitted). "An error arising from a violation of the federal
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constitution is considered harmless when an appellate court is "able to declare a belief
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quotations and citationomitted). "In
order to make this declaration, i t is necessary to review the facts of the case and the
evidence adduced at trial' to determine the effect of the challenged evidence 'upon the
other evidence adduced at trial and upon the conduct of the defense." Id. (quotations and
citation omitted).
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. and UT. CONST. ART. 1, §12 indicate that a defendant
shall not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This Court
has held, "...the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." State
v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 971 (Utah App.,1993) citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Such safeguards "...come into play whenever
a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional
equivalent." Id., citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64
L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); see also State v. Mirquet 844 P.2d 995, 997 (Utah App.,1992) ("[a]s
a matter of federal law, an individual's right to the protections afforded in Miranda are
triggered the moment the individual is subject to custodial interrogation."). Mirquet
further continues as follows:
We concluded [in State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App.1990)] that
Utah courts place "a great deal of emphasis on the form of the questioning"
in assessing whether the defendant is in custody. Id. If questioning is
"merely investigatory, courts have not found custody." Id. {citing State v.
Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah, 1986). However, the moment the questioning
15

becomes accusatory "custody is likely and Miranda warnings become
necessary." Id. {citing Garner, 664 P.2d at 1170; Kelly, 718 P.2d at 391).
The court identified the change from investigatory to accusatory
questioning as happening when the "'police have reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to
believe that the defendant has committed it."' Id. 808 P.2d at 1106 (quoting
Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171).
State v. Mirquet 844 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah App., 1992) (alteration to the original).
This Court has held the custody factors as found in Mirquet are inadequate to
determine whether an incarcerated suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes. See, State
v. Swink, 2000 UT App. 262,1[10, 11 P.3d 299. Hence, Swink determined, "[f]or persons
incarcerated at the time of interrogation, the custody question generally turns on the
'added imposition' analysis outlined in Cervantes [v. Walker 589 F.2d 424, (9th Circuit
1978)]." Id. citing Id. at 428; (further citations omitted.) Swink held as follows:
In any Miranda analysis, whether the encounter occurs on the street, or
within the walls of a correctional facility, we must consider whether the
individual was "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Since a prisoner in a
correctional facility is obviously not free to leave the facility, we must look
for "a change in the surroundings of the prisoner which results in an added
imposition on his freedom of movement," or "some act which places
further limitations on the prisoner." Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428. The
Cervantes court offered the following four relevant considerations to be
viewed from the perspective of a reasonable prisoner: (1) the language used
to summon the inmate, (2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation,
(3) the extent to which the inmate is confronted with evidence of his guilt,
and (4) the additional pressure exerted to detain the inmate. See id.
Id. at T[l 1. In U.S. v. Conley the Fourth Circuit stated the following:
A different approach to the custody determination is warranted in the
paradigmatic custodial prison setting where, by definition, the entire
population is under restraint of free movement. The Ninth Circuit has taken
the position that "restriction" is a relative concept and that, in this context,
it "necessarily implies a change in the surroundings of the prisoner which

16

results in an added imposition on his freedom of movement." Cervantes,
589 F.2d at 428. Thus, the court looked to the circumstances of the
interrogation to determine whether the inmate was subjected to more than
the usual restraint on a prisoner's liberty to depart.
Ibid., 779 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus, a reconciliation of Miranda must be made in
inmate cases. In U.S. v. Cadmus, it states as follows and sheds some further light on this
issue:
The court in Cervantes rejected a per se rule that any investigatory
questioning inside a prison requires Miranda warnings. 589 F.2d at 427. In
determining that the questioning involved had not occurred while the
defendant was in custody, the court in Cervantes held that an "added
imposition on [the inmate's] freedom of movement" is necessary to
constitute "custody" within the principles of Miranda. Id. at 428. See also
Scalf, 725 F.2d 1272 (adopting reasoning of Cervantes).
Ibid, 614 F.Supp. 367, 370 (D.C.N.Y.,1985). Cadmus found "that prison interrogation,
whether by an investigator concerning prior potentially criminal conduct, or by a prison
guard regarding prison crime immediately after its discovery, is custodial within the
meaning of Miranda." Id. at 371-372. In support of this determination, Cadmus
continued:
A rule that persons in prison are in custody and must be advised of their
rights prior to questioning is fully consistent with the logic underlying
Miranda and Mathis. Miranda established a prophylactic rule intended to
ensure that suspects are not coerced into confessing. See Berkemer, 104
S.Ct. at 3147; see also Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74, 100 S.Ct. at 2188. The
rule was designed for situations believed to be intrinsically coercive and
susceptible of abuse. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624
("inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely"); see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104
S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). Prison is certainly a "police
dominated" surrounding that is inherently coercive. See Berkemer, 104
S.Ct. at 3150, 3150 n. 28. Miranda recognized the powerful psychological
effect on a person confined, alone with his interrogator, which often
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induces the individual to reach for aid. 384 U.S. at 448-55, 86 S.Ct. at
1614-17. This powerful influence is certainly present when the individual is
confined in prison. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74, 100 S.Ct. at 2188.
Furthermore, the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation derives in
large part from the knowledge of the accused that he cannot escape his
interrogator, and that the questioning can continue until the desired answer
is obtained. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468, 86 S.Ct. at 1624; see also
Murphy, 104 S.Ct. at 1145-46. In Murphy, the Court discussed the situation
where "a suspect ... is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a
persistent custodial interrogator." 104 S.Ct. at 1146. It would be hard to
conceive of a situation where the accused was less able to escape his
interrogator than in a prison setting. Compare Berkemer, 104 S.Ct. at 314950 (motorist stopped for traffic stop reasonably expects to be free to
continue on his way in short order). Indeed, in this case, Cadmus had
already spent seven days in detention. There was no way for him to know
when he might at least be able to return to his home.
Id. at 372.
In the instant case, Freestone received a photocopy of a letter written by Butt from
Black. Tr. at p. 51. Freestone testified he was concerned after looking at the letter so "I
went to the outgoing mail and retrieved that letter for investigation." Id.

Freestone

testified he spoke with Butt concerning the letter on November 14, 2008, and advised him
the letter was being confiscated. Tr. at p. 56. Freestone next spoke with Butt on
November 17, 2008, in reference to the Second Letter. Id. Freestone testified he became
aware of the Second Letter in the same manner as the First Letter. Tr. at p. 62. Freestone
testified he indicated to Butt the Second Letter had been confiscated. Tr. at p. 64.
Johnson testified she had a conversation with Butt about the ages of his children.
Tr. at p. 85. Johnson testified the conversation took place in November of 2008. Johnson
testified she asked Butt about the ages of his children because Freestone had asked her to
do so. Johnson testified Freestone did not tell her why to ask about Butt's children's ages
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until after she asked him. Tr. at p. 87. Johnson testified that, later on, she became aware
of letters Butt had written. Tr. at p. 88. Johnson testified she did not read Butt his
Miranda rights before questioning him. Tr. at p. 89. Johnson testified she asked Butt what
the names and ages of his children were, which he indicated were Sage, his daughter, five
(5) years old, and Kade, his son, eight (8) years old. Id. Johnson testified she either
placed her note indicating Butt's children's ages in Freestone's box or handed it directly
to Freestone and she did so on the same day she questioned Butt. Tr. at p. 95.
As an inmate in the San Juan County Jail, Butt was clearly not free to leave. Swink
at Tfl 1. However, Freestone and Johnson's investigation of Butt placed further limitations
on him than normal. Id. Johnson was acting as Freestone's investigator to further
determine Butt's criminal conduct - conduct Freestone clearly found so concerning he
tracked down the First Letter from further processing - and because of this increased
limitation, any questioning should have been prefaced with the Miranda warning.
Cadmus at 371-372.
Miranda was intended to ensure suspects are not coerced into confessing as it was
designed for situations believed to be intrinsically coercive and susceptible to abuse. Id.
at 372. Interrogators should take extra precautions when questioning inmates for this
very reason, recognizing their inability to "escape," and allowing interrogators such as
Freestone to continue until the desired answers were obtained. Id. Butt resided in the San
Juan County Jail from September 20, 2008, until January 30. 2009. Tr. at p. 105. He was
questioned by Johnson in November of 2008. He was unable to be questioned and still
feel "free to leave" Freestone or Johnson because he resided in the jail. See, Cadmus at
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372. The situation calls for Miranda based on the propensity for abuse and coerciveness
due to his incarceration status. Cadmus at 371-372. Giving of Miranda is simplistic and
ensures that Butt would have recognized his ability to freely "walk away" from
questioning.
Johnson subjected Butt to express questioning by asking him the ages of his
children, which is a direct element of the charges herein. Furthermore, this information
was required to file the charges herein against Butt. Johnson's questions were accusatory
because Freestone had reasonable grounds to believe crimes had been committed and
reasonable grounds to believe Butt had committed them. Mirquet at 998. Therefore, a
Miranda warning was required and, in its absence, Butt was compelled to be a witness
against himself in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. U.S. CONST.
AMEND. V. and UT. CONST. ART. 1, §12.

Because Butt was compelled to be a witness against himself it is clear that such
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Butt's Fifth Amendment rights were
implicated without the protections afforded him thereunder, as required under Miranda.
He had a constitutional right to be informed that the information being obtained could be
used against him in court. Thus, this Court should determine that Miranda warnings
were required and that, because they were not given, the error that occurred was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Butt respectfully requests that this
Court review this matter and take any such further action as this Court deems necessary.
DATED this 20th day of May, 2010.

William L. Schultz
Attorney for Eric Leon Butt

21

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of May, 2010, I mailed, first class postage
prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to:
Mr. Ryan D. Tenney
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

oo

«nOi

APELLATE COURTS

W 25

m

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Butt respectfully requests that
this Court review this matter and take any such further action as this Court deems
necessary.
DATED this 20th day of May, 2010.
/

UJJM,
William L. Schultz
Attorney for Eric Leon

riLXLU

^"AHAPPEOATE COURTS

MAY 2 5 2010
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

^*6CT 0 lgcB&~Cr<

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of May, 2010,1 mailed, first class
postage prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief ofAppellant
to:

Mr. Ryan D. Tenney
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
i hereby certify that on this 20th day of May, 2010 J mailed, first class
postage prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief ofAppellant
to:

Mr. Ryan D. Tcnncy
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6lh Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

WHF.RhFORh. based upon t|«|i|egoing, Bull respectfully requests thai
this Court review this matter and take any such further action as this Court deems
necessary.
DAlliD ihis 20th day of May, 2010.

William L. Schultz
Attorney for Brie Leon

